Who funds the illegal driver market in the UK and EU?

Illegal OTA and Illegal Aggregators and Illegal Driver Networks in EU and UK Ground Transport Transfers explained.

Online travel agencies (OTAs) have expanded into arranging airport and hotel ground transfers, but some operate outside the law by setting prices and selecting drivers and using unlicensed intermediaries and drivers. In these illegal OTA–aggregator–driver chains, a traveler books a transfer online through an illegaly operating OTA, which then hands off the ride to an unlicensed transfer aggregator platform, and ultimately to an unlicensed local driver. This report examines how such chains function, how each link evades VAT taxes and licensing requirements, and the flow of money from customer to driver. We also assess the economic impact of these grey-market operations – from tax losses to the growth of unregulated transport – and provide real examples and legal cases. The analysis is divided into two regions: the European Union (with its diverse member-state regulations) and the United Kingdom (with its post-Brexit regulatory framework). Each section covers the legal context, economic implications, and known enforcement actions in that region.

European Union (EU) – Illegal Private Vehicle Derivers Networks

Structure of the OTA–Aggregator–Driver Chain in the EU

In the EU, illegal transfer networks often involve multiple parties to mask responsibility. A typical chain works as follows:

• Online Travel Agency (OTA): The OTA (e.g. a travel website or booking platform) markets ground transfer services (airport pickups, hotel shuttles, etc.) to travelers. The OTA often sets a fixed price for the route and collects payment from the customer during booking. By setting prices and offering the service, the OTA is effectively acting as a transport provider rather than a neutral broker . However, illicit OTAs will claim they are “just an intermediary” to dodge transport regulations.

• Transfer Aggregator: Behind the scenes, the OTA partners with an unlicensed transfer aggregator or dispatcher. This intermediary has a roster of drivers and handles the logistics of assigning a driver to the booking. If the aggregator fixes the fare and selects a driver for the ride, legally it is functioning as a transportation operator (similar to Uber’s model) . Illegal aggregators attempt to operate without the required taxi or private hire operator licenses by exploiting the “information society service” label – essentially pretending to be a passive digital marketplace. In reality, many such platforms manage the booking and dispatch (choosing the driver and timing) and thus are deeply involved in the transport service . Notably, a 2017 Court of Justice of the EU ruling (Elite Taxi v. Uber) confirmed that a platform like Uber providing price-setting and ride coordination “falls outside” the mere intermediary category and is considered a transport service subject to local taxi laws . Despite this precedent, copycat services have proliferated, attempting to mimic Uber’s model without obtaining licenses and avoiding to pay VAT taxes.

• Unlicensed Driver: The final link is the local driver who actually performs the transfer. In a legal service, this driver would be a licensed taxi or private hire driver operating a registered commercial vehicle. In the illegal chain, the driver is often unlicensed (and uninsured) for passenger transport. They might be a private individual with a normal car or van (for example, using a personal vehicle with private plates instead of commercial ones). These drivers often join the aggregator’s network informally – responding to ride requests via app or messanger or even email . In some cases, drivers simply wait at airports or hotels and solicit passengers in person, then use the OTA platform to process the ride, giving a veneer of “booking” to what is essentially taxi touting. For instance, at Paris Charles de Gaulle Airport, authorities noted a sharp rise in illegal taxi activity, with 918 warnings issued to unlicensed drivers in one year (2017), up from 243 the year prior . This shows just a tiny drop on how many unlicensed drivers operate in tourist hubs, often finding clients by approaching confused travelers or through illegal apps.

How the Chain Functions: A traveler may book an “airport shuttle” on an OTA’s website, paying, say, €50 for a ride from the airport to their hotel. The OTA forwards the request to its partner aggregator. The aggregator assigns one of its drivers (perhaps via a driver app notification or email). The driver arrives (often holding a name sign) and provides the ride. To the customer, the service appears seamless, but each step is conducted by actors evading legal obligations.

Evasion of VAT and Licensing Requirements in the EU

VAT (Value Added Tax) Evasion: In the EU, passenger transport fares are generally subject to VAT in the country where the transport occurs, at the rate set by that country . A licensed taxi or car service in the EU would charge VAT to the passenger and later remit it to the tax authority. Illegal OTA chains avoid this in several ways:

• The OTA often does not add VAT to the transfer price even when it should. If the OTA is deemed the supplier of the service (as would likely be the case when it fixes the price and collects payment), it should register and charge VAT in the country of the ride . Illicit actors try to dodge this by claiming the driver is the real supplier and responsible for VAT, not the platform. In practice, the unlicensed driver almost never charges VAT – many are individuals operating “off the books” and below national VAT registration thresholds. For example, if an OTA based outside France sells a Paris airport transfer, French VAT law still applies to that service in Paris . Unless the OTA or its intermediary registers to pay French VAT (or uses a special scheme like the Tour Operators Margin Scheme), it is evading tax. EU tax authorities are increasingly cracking down on such arrangements: they look beyond contractual labels to see who is “controlling the service” and thus who is the de facto seller responsible for VAT . After the CJEU’s Uber ruling in 2017 and subsequent cases, platforms that set prices have been reclassified as transport providers for tax purposes, forcing them to start charging VAT on rides . An OTA that ignores this runs the risk of hefty back-tax assessments. If caught, they could be liable for 20% VAT on all undeclared fares, plus penalties. Tax authorities can pursue the OTA or aggregator in each country where rides took place, leading to multi-country enforcement actions in the EU .

• Some travel OTAs attempt to use the Tour Operators Margin Scheme (TOMS), an EU VAT scheme that lets tour resellers pay VAT only on their profit margin. This can legalize not charging full VAT to customers if used properly. However, TOMS is complex and only applies to certain multi-component travel packages. A standalone point-to-point transfer often doesn’t qualify. If an OTA or its partner marks up a transfer price without applying VAT, it may be violating VAT law. For instance, if an OTA buys a transfer for €40 (from an aggregator or driver) and sells it for €50 to the customer, EU law would require VAT on the €50 unless a valid exemption or scheme applies . Illegal setups often ignore this, leaving a 20% (approximately) tax unpaid on each sale. Over hundreds of rides, this adds up to significant tax loss.

Avoiding Transport Licensing: Transportation services in the EU are regulated at the national (or local) level. Operating a taxi or private hire service typically requires a license or authorization from local authorities in each country. The OTA–aggregator–driver chain tries to circumvent these requirements:

• The OTA and aggregator often operate without any taxi or private hire operator license. They claim to be software platforms or “information society services” under the EU E-Commerce Directive, which would normally exempt mere digital intermediaries from sector-specific transport laws . However, EU courts have drawn a line: if the platform is “inextricably linked to the transport service” – for example, by setting prices and dictating how the service is provided – then it is not a protected digital service but a transport operator . The Uber Spain case (C‑434/15, 2017) made this clear, allowing member states to enforce taxi laws on such platforms . Therefore, an OTA/aggregator in the EU is legally required to obtain local transport operator licenses (or partner only with licensed carriers) in each jurisdiction where it arranges rides . Illegal networks ignore this. For example, in France providing transport without the proper license violates the Transport Code – Uber’s low-cost UberPOP service (using unlicensed drivers) was banned and led to fines and even criminal convictions for Uber executives . In Spain, acting as a transport intermediary without authorization was deemed unfair competition, prompting injunctions against Uber until it complied . Despite such rulings, rogue OTA platforms continue to pop up, trying to fly under regulators’ radar by not having a physical presence in the country or by using local subcontractors.

• The drivers in these chains lack the required licenses (and often insurance) to carry passengers for hire. In many EU countries, drivers must have a professional taxi or private hire permit, undergo background checks, and use vehicles with commercial registration (for instance, green license plates in some countries). Unlicensed drivers avoid these costs and requirements. They typically operate vehicles that are registered as private cars, meaning they have not passed the special inspections or insurance for commercial passenger service. This puts passengers at risk and violates laws. Enforcement against drivers is ongoing: for example, Greek police in 2024 cracked down on unlicensed airport shuttles in Athens, seizing 42 mini-vans that were illegally carrying passengers without taxi licenses . Each driver was fined and had their driving license temporarily revoked . Such operations highlight that many drivers were running a covert transport business (often via online bookings) without any registration. In France, too, authorities conduct stings at airports – Paris’s Roissy (CDG) airport has a permanent task force against illegal taxis, and officials noted these unlicensed operators were proliferating rapidly . Illegal drivers, if caught, can face fines, vehicle impoundment, and even criminal charges (France’s penal code was used to prosecute UberPOP drivers and Uber staff for “facilitating illegal transport” ). However, because the profits can be high and the chance of any one driver being stopped is relatively low on a per-trip basis, many still take the risk, especially when fed customers by an aggregator.

Money Flow Through the Illegal Chain

One hallmark of these grey-market operations is a convoluted money flow designed to conceal profits and avoid taxation. In a legitimate scenario, a licensed transport company would collect payment (including VAT) and pay the driver as an employee or contractor with appropriate tax withholding. In the illegal OTA–aggregator–driver chain, money is split in ways that often escape tax authorities’ notice:

• Customer Payment: The traveler typically pays the OTA online, often in advance, via credit card. The OTA may be based in a different country (or even outside the EU) to complicate jurisdiction. For instance, a traveler in Germany booking a ride in Italy might pay an OTA incorporated in a tax haven or non-EU country. The receipt might not mention VAT at all, or it may list the OTA as an agent of the driver. This lack of VAT on the invoice is a red flag that the service is being sold “off the books” . If the OTA is abroad, the payment might not trigger an automatic VAT charge, exploiting cross-border digital service loopholes.

• OTA to Aggregator: The OTA will take its cut (commission or markup) and then pass the booking details and remaining funds to the transfer aggregator. This could be done by the OTA paying the aggregator a wholesale rate (e.g. OTA keeps 20% and pays 80% of the fare to the aggregator). Often these payments are done electronically across borders without VAT, by treating the aggregator as an “independent service provider.” Indeed, Uber used a similar model by treating each local driver as an independent business; Uber’s European arm routed booking fees internationally and claimed no VAT was due since drivers were small businesses – a tactic that saved Uber tens of millions (it collected over £200 million in UK ride fees annually while avoiding at least £40 million in VAT by treating 40,000 drivers as separate small entities) . Illegal aggregators copy this playbook, often not registering for VAT locally and arguing the self-employed drivers are responsible for any tax.

• Aggregator to Driver: The aggregator then pays the driver, usually after the ride is completed. Payment can be in cash or via bank transfer/app. Some unlicensed drivers prefer cash to remain anonymous – for example, the driver may be paid directly by the customer in cash at the end of the ride (some OTAs instruct the traveler that the fare has been pre-paid, so no cash is due, while others facilitate a cash payment on site that the driver then splits with the aggregator under the table). More commonly with pre-bookings, the driver will receive an electronic payout from the aggregator (weekly or monthly). Aggregators may label these payouts as something innocuous (like “rebate” or “private car rental income”) to avoid scrutiny. The Klook case showed a driver being “on standby” for requests and presumably getting paid per trip via the intermediary . If the driver is not a registered business, they likely do not declare this income or pay VAT on it. The responsibility for VAT in a legal sense would have lain with the service provider – here arguably the driver – but if the driver stays below VAT thresholds or is simply invisible to tax authorities, the VAT is never remitted by anyone . In sum, the OTA and aggregator intentionally push the taxable event down to a level (the individual driver) where compliance is least likely. This diffuse chain makes it challenging for authorities to trace the full flow of money.

Summary of Money Flow Evasion: The OTA–aggregator–driver chain is engineered to leave no single entity clearly accountable for taxes. The OTA claims to be an agent (avoiding VAT on the full customer charge), the aggregator often isn’t a formally recognized party at all in the customer’s eyes, and the driver may be a one-man informal operator. Each link in the chain may fall below thresholds or outside jurisdictions, resulting in no VAT collected on the final sale. Profits from the rides are split: the OTA takes a margin (often not declared in the destination country), the aggregator takes a commission, and the driver gets the remainder (often untaxed income). This chain, therefore, allows revenue to flow from a traveler in the EU to an unlicensed driver with multiple points at which tax and regulatory compliance is dodged.

Operations of Unlicensed Drivers and Client Acquisition

The unlicensed drivers in these networks operate in a legal grey zone, using both online platforms and on-the-ground tactics to find customers:

• Aggregator Dispatch: Many drivers get their rides from the illegal aggregator’s platform. They sign up (usually with minimal vetting – often just a driver’s license and car documents, which may not even be appropriate for commercial service) and then await ride assignments. Some aggregators have driver apps similar to Uber, while others use simpler means like phone, WhatsApp, or email to send job details. Here is the case, the driver responded to requests via email and waited near the airport for gigs . This indicates the driver was effectively “on call” for an unlicensed dispatcher. In the EU, similar patterns occur – for example, unlicensed minivan drivers in tourist destinations might coordinate via informal WhatsApp groups run by a fixer who has contacts with travel agents. The OTA booking essentially triggers a message to the driver: “Pick up Mr. X at 3 PM from Airport Terminal 1, going to Hotel Y.” The driver then knows this is a paying client delivered through the back-channel network.

• Touting and Partnerships: Some unlicensed drivers supplement their work by touting at airports and hotels to grab riders, especially if they have gaps between dispatched jobs. They might approach travelers in arrival halls or near taxi queues, offering a ride. Often, they pretend to be the legitimate pick-up arranged by the traveler’s hotel or travel agency (“Hello, taxi for [Name]?” as a way to confuse the traveler). If the traveler hasn’t pre-booked, an illegal driver might negotiate a cash fare on the spot. This street touting is common in major cities – London’s Heathrow, for example, has had persistent problems with unlicensed cab touts approaching passengers. Heathrow’s operator even employs a “tout squad” with plainclothes officers to catch them . Despite enforcement, the practice continues because successful touts can charge exorbitant rates. (Licensed London black cabs reported illegal drivers at Heathrow charging well above official fares – sometimes £100+ for a trip that would be £60-£80 in a regulated taxi .) In the EU, airports like CDG Paris have also warned that illegal drivers aggressively solicit tourists, undermining the reputation of local transport .

• Client Sources: Unlicensed drivers often get clients from tour operators and hotels as well. In some resort areas, hotel concierges or villa owners quietly cooperate with unlicensed transfer providers, because they may receive a kickback. An OTA or aggregator might encourage this by offering referral fees to travel agents or hotels that book through them. For example, an EU hotel might book an airport transfer for a guest via an OTA’s platform, not realizing (or ignoring) that the OTA uses unlicensed cars. The hotel might be lured by slightly cheaper prices or commission. There have been cases in Europe of hotels being complicit in arranging unlicensed airport pickups for guests to save costs – until local authorities cracked down on that practice. In Greece, it was noted that an OTA arranging transfers might need a tourism transport license or must partner with a licensed travel agency , underscoring that even booking on someone’s behalf can carry responsibility. Illegal networks try to bypass these rules by informal agreements rather than official partnerships.

• Operating Tactics: To avoid detection, unlicensed drivers adopt various tactics. They may use uncertain signage – for example, holding a small sign with a name, hoping to pass as a pre-booked chauffeur (which makes police less likely to question them, since it looks like an arranged pickup). They also tend to avoid taxi ranks (where licensed taxis queue and authorities monitor) and instead arrange to meet passengers at parking lots or drop-off zones. In the Athens crackdown mentioned, some vans did not have any markings, which was one of the violations noted (no sign indicating a transport service) . In some instances, drivers even use “stealth” tactics like switching license plates (one UK case involved a Heathrow tout with fake number plates to avoid cameras and insurance checks ). All these measures make it harder for enforcement to track illegal drivers, allowing them to continue operating and connecting with clients provided by illicit aggregators or chance encounters.

In summary, unlicensed drivers in the EU rely on both digital facilitation and old-fashioned hustling. The OTA/aggregator feeds them a steady stream of naive travelers who booked online, while any downtime can be filled by directly soliciting passengers. This dual approach helps the grey-market drivers maximize business outside the confines of regulation.

Economic Impact in the EU: VAT Losses and Grey-Market Growth

The proliferation of illegal OTA–driver networks in Europe has significant economic consequences:

• Tax Revenue Losses: By avoiding VAT and income taxes, these operations deprive governments of substantial revenue. Each illegal ride potentially cheats the treasury of the VAT that should have been charged (commonly around 20% in many EU countries). Scale this up to thousands of rides across popular destinations and the sums become huge. For perspective, when Uber was operating under a semi-legal model, it was estimated to be saving at least £40 million a year in the UK alone by not paying VAT on its service fees . Across the EU, countries that initially did not enforce VAT on ride-hailing saw similar losses. Tax authorities now increasingly force compliance (Uber, for instance, began charging VAT on EU rides after legal pressure ). But illicit OTAs that remain in the shadows continue to generate a VAT gap. A study in Sweden by the national taxi association estimated that since deregulation in 1990, over SEK 30 billion (≈ €3 billion) in taxes have been lost in the taxi industry due to fraud and undeclared operations . Even though that figure spans decades and all types of taxi fraud, it underscores how large the black market can grow. Currently, authorities estimate about SEK 1 billion per year in tax evasion in the Swedish taxi sector . Similar patterns likely exist in other EU countries where unlicensed rides slip under the tax radar. Each illegal transfer booking contributes to the “grey economy,” forcing honest taxpayers and businesses to effectively subsidize the cheats.

• Undermining Legitimate Business: Illegal OTA networks undercut licensed transport operators on price (or sometimes hijack unwitting customers as in the airport scams). By skirting costs like licensing fees, proper insurance, vehicle inspections, and taxes, they can charge lower rates or yield higher margins. This creates unfair competition. Law-abiding taxi and shuttle companies struggle to compete if travelers are being siphoned away by platforms that don’t play by the rules. The European Commission and national regulators recognize this as an “unfair competitive advantage” issue . Essentially, those who evade the law can temporarily offer a cheaper or more ubiquitous service, capturing market share. The result is a growth of a grey market in passenger transport: more drivers may be tempted to drop their licenses and join the untaxed circuit, seeing the success of others. The market share of rides provided through unofficial channels grows, while the regulated sector shrinks or remains stagnant. This was evident in cities like Paris and Barcelona during the heyday of UberPOP – thousands of people signed up to drive without professional licenses, quickly taking a slice of urban transport before regulators intervened. The number of warnings issued to illegal drivers at Paris’s CDG airport quadrupled within a couple of years , indicating rapid growth of the grey market until counter-measures were taken.

• Consumer Risks and Broader Costs: Although harder to quantify, there are economic costs associated with the safety and quality issues of these illegal services. Passengers who use them may face price-gouging or fraud (since there’s little oversight). If there’s an accident, the lack of insurance can leave victims uncompensated, effectively socializing the cost (e.g. public healthcare might bear the injury costs). There is also reputational damage to destinations – tourists scammed or endangered by illegal transfers may spend less or not return, affecting the local tourism economy. Recognizing this, EU consumer protection agencies have fined companies like Uber not just for licensing breaches but for deceptive practices in presenting rides as safe and legal when they were not . In France, UberPOP’s misrepresentation of its legality was deemed a misleading commercial practice, leading to penalties . This underscores that the grey market’s growth can erode trust, which has its own economic ripple effects.

Real-World Data and Rulings: Several cases highlight the economic and legal reckoning of these practices in the EU. Uber’s experience is instructive: after the CJEU ruling that it is a transport service (2017) and subsequent pressure, Uber had to start charging VAT on all rides in many EU markets, eliminating what had been a major tax advantage . In France, as mentioned, Uber was fined €800,000 in 2016 for running an illegal transport service (UberPOP) and executives were convicted, signaling that authorities would not tolerate large-scale organized tax/license evasion . In Germany, courts issued injunctions that forced Uber to restructure and only work with licensed rental car companies, preventing the entry of a grey-market fleet . These enforcement actions, while targeted at high-profile companies, sent a message across the industry. They show that the short-term profits from avoidance can be wiped out by fines and required compliance measures . Smaller OTA and aggregator players have likewise faced pushback: for example, Spanish regulators banned local clones of Uber that tried to use unlicensed drivers, and Italian authorities have conducted sweeps against unlicensed NCC (chauffeur) services operating via apps.

European regulators are increasingly coordinating on this issue. Under the EU’s Consumer Protection Cooperation network, a platform flouting the law in multiple member states could face an EU-wide enforcement action . The overall trend is that the “grey area” is shrinking – courts and laws are adapting to close loopholes. As one analysis put it, Europe is moving to “level the playing field” such that innovation must happen within the bounds of tax and licensing laws, not by evading them . In other words, the economic model of these illegal OTA chains is ultimately unsustainable in the face of tightening regulations, but in the interim, they have caused significant distortion in the market and loss to public finances.

United Kingdom (UK) – Illegal Transfer Networks

Structure of the OTA–Aggregator–Driver Chain in the UK

The United Kingdom’s experience with ride-hailing and unlicensed operators has many parallels to the continent, though the UK has its own legal framework post-Brexit. An illegal OTA–aggregator–driver network in the UK functions similarly, with some key distinctions influenced by UK laws:

• Online Travel Agency (OTA): In the UK context, any company or website that accepts a booking for a private hire journey is legally considered the principal operator of that journey . This was underscored by a 2023 High Court case (Uber Britannia Ltd v. Sefton MBC) which affirmed that the entity accepting a passenger’s booking enters into the contract with the passenger . What this means is that if an OTA (say a UK-based or even foreign-based website) allows a customer to reserve an airport taxi, UK law views that OTA as the provider of the service – with all attendant licensing obligations. Illegal OTAs in the UK attempt to dodge this by portraying themselves as mere agents for drivers, but the courts have rejected that argument . The OTA in an illegal chain will typically set a fixed price in GBP for an airport or hotel transfer (e.g. £50 to get from Heathrow to Central London) and take the booking on their website. They often advertise broadly online, targeting tourists and even working through travel agents. By setting prices and advertising transfers, they operate like a private hire company but without declaring themselves as such.

• Aggregator/Dispatcher: If the OTA itself isn’t directly dispatching drivers (sometimes the OTA and aggregator role are merged in one entity), there may be a separate transfer aggregator coordinating the UK rides. Often these aggregators are not UK companies – they might be overseas call centers or apps that have recruited UK drivers. The aggregator matches the booking to an available driver in the destination city. In a legal scenario, any such dispatching entity in the UK would need a Private Hire Vehicle (PHV) operator license from the local authority (e.g. Transport for London for London area rides). Illegal aggregators do not have this license. They rely on a network of unlicensed or semi-licensed drivers. Some drivers may hold a PHV license individually, but if they take jobs from an unlicensed operator (the OTA/aggregator), that itself is unlawful. The chain functions with the aggregator sending the driver details (pickup, passenger name, etc.) via an app or text message. The driver is expected to carry out the job as if it were a legitimate pre-booking. However, because the booking was not passed through a licensed UK operator, it violates the law. As noted by UK regulators, any company that “facilitates bookings” is effectively a PHV operator and cannot operate without a license . Illegal aggregators often ignore this, especially if they are based outside the UK or operate purely online without a physical office.

• Unlicensed Driver: The driver in the UK chain might be completely unlicensed (no taxi or PHV license), or sometimes a licensed driver moonlighting with an illegal platform. Pure unlicensed drivers are essentially illegal minicabs. In London and other UK cities, enforcement against unlicensed drivers is strict, so many of the drivers that illegal OTAs use may have at least a basic PHV license but choose to accept extra jobs through unauthorized channels (which can still get them in trouble). Others might use fake or borrowed licenses. The truly unlicensed drivers often operate in airport environments, attempting to blend in with legitimate chauffeurs picking up pre-booked passengers. They may use ordinary cars or even executive-looking vehicles without the requisite insurance or checks. One common profile is recently arrived individuals who do not go through the official licensing (which requires background checks, English tests, knowledge tests, etc., depending on the locale) and instead join a friend or community network offering rides to tourists for cash. In the UK, operating as an unlicensed driver or for an unlicensed operator is a criminal offense; despite that, Heathrow Airport and others have long struggled with such drivers, indicating a persistent supply. In one enforcement action (Operation Gadi at Heathrow in 2024), police arrested 6 drivers who were running an organized ring of taxi touts at the airport . These drivers coordinated to solicit travelers and had no proper insurance or operator backing – essentially exactly what an illegal OTA’s field operation would look like, albeit these were catching passengers on the ground. This shows that unlicensed driver networks exist in an organized fashion in the UK.

Chain Operation in Practice: Suppose a traveler uses a UK OTA website to book a hotel transfer from Manchester Airport to a city center hotel. The OTA confirms the booking and charges the traveler £40. Behind the scenes, the OTA’s unlicensed operation finds a driver – perhaps via a partner dispatcher or directly if the OTA runs its own dispatch app. The driver (who may not have a Manchester PHV operator to work with) gets the job details on their phone. They show up at Manchester Airport arrivals, hold up a sign, meet the traveler, and drive them to the hotel. The traveler might assume this was a normal pre-booked car service. In reality, the OTA broke the law by not having a local operator license, and the driver broke the law if he accepted the booking outside of a licensed framework. Both also likely didn’t charge VAT or pay tax on the income. This clandestine arrangement can continue until a regulator notices irregularities or an enforcement sting catches someone involved.

Avoidance of VAT and Licensing in the UK

VAT Evasion: The UK charges 20% VAT on taxi and private hire fares (with very limited exceptions) . A licensed taxi company or Uber now adds VAT to ride fares in the UK. Illegal OTAs try to avoid VAT in a couple of ways:

• Not Charging VAT to Customers: If an OTA sets a price for the transfer (say £50 as in the example above) and collects payment, by law it should be adding £8.33 of VAT within that price and later paying it to HMRC. Unlawful operators often do not do this – they present the £50 as a “flat fare” with no tax line item, assuming (or hoping) that neither the customer nor tax authorities will notice. This is effectively a 20% competitive edge. However, HMRC does look at the “economic reality” of these transactions . If the OTA is controlling the price and providing the service, HMRC considers the OTA the supplier for VAT. The UK courts have backed this stance – notably in the Uber cases which concluded Uber was a principal supplier, forcing it to start charging VAT on rides . An OTA that fails to charge VAT when it should is committing tax evasion. HMRC has pursued such cases: Uber’s model prior to 2022 didn’t add VAT on fares, and once reclassified, Uber faced an enormous back-tax claim. In fact, Uber opted to start adding VAT proactively in March 2022, anticipating enforcement, and later settled a £615 million bill for past unpaid VAT . This shows HMRC’s seriousness. A smaller OTA caught in a similar violation could be liable for 20% of all past fares sold, plus penalties and interest . Such liability can be ruinous – potentially millions of pounds if the OTA has been operating at scale.

• Use of VAT Schemes or Loopholes: Some travel businesses in the UK attempt to use schemes like TOMS (Tour Operator’s Margin Scheme) for transfer services. Under TOMS, if the OTA is packaging the transfer as part of a wider travel service, it might only owe VAT on its margin rather than the full price. However, a standalone transfer usually doesn’t meet the criteria for special treatment . Another tactic (which Uber used pre-2022) was treating the supply as if it were made by the driver (each driver considered a small business under the VAT threshold). Uber exploited a loophole for B2B services across EU borders – Uber BV (Netherlands) would invoice UK drivers for “use of platform” and since each driver’s earnings were below the VAT threshold, no one paid VAT . This saved Uber about £1,000 per driver per year, adding up to ~£40 million yearly advantage in the UK . An OTA might try a similar approach: for example, set up a shell company abroad that “hires” UK drivers as independent contractors, thus not charging VAT on the fees paid by drivers. HMRC has grown wise to this strategy. Other ride-hailing firms in the UK (Gett, mytaxi) did charge VAT on their fees and criticized Uber’s avoidance . Today, a blatant attempt to repeat this would likely trigger a swift HMRC challenge. In short, the window for VAT loopholes in UK ride services is closing. Any OTA or aggregator that is effectively selling UK transport without VAT is operating on borrowed time. As of 2023, even foreign-based platforms are not immune – if they have UK customers and control the service, HMRC can assert jurisdiction and demand VAT registration.

Licensing and Regulatory Evasion: The UK has a stringent and well-defined licensing regime for transport which illegal networks attempt to flout:

• Private Hire Operator Licensing: By law, any entity that accepts or facilitates a private hire booking in the UK must hold a PHV operator license (granted by local authorities) . This applies whether the bookings are via phone, app, or website. In London, for example, Transport for London (TfL) requires operators to be licensed and meet specific standards (insurance, record-keeping, driver vetting, etc.). Illegal OTAs usually do not have such licenses. They might not even have a physical office in the UK to apply from. Operating without an operator’s license is a criminal offense under the Local Government (Misc Provisions) Act 1976 and the London PHV Act. If caught, the OTA’s principals could face fines or prosecution. For instance, when Uber operated in certain UK jurisdictions without the appropriate local license, it faced legal battles and had to restructure – ultimately obtaining a London operator’s license and others. An OTA doing the same in multiple cities would need multiple local licenses (one for each area it operates in, since UK operator licenses are region-specific). The illegal aggregators avoid this overhead entirely. They gamble that enforcement will be patchy, especially if they operate online and advertise mainly to foreign tourists who won’t know the licensing situation. Nonetheless, UK authorities do conduct undercover bookings and investigations. If an OTA is found arranging transfers without a license, authorities can issue cease-and-desist orders and even seek High Court injunctions to stop its operations in the region .

• Driver Licensing and Vehicle Compliance: Every driver carrying passengers for hire in the UK must have the appropriate license (taxi or PHV) and the vehicle must have a hire license and insurance. Illegal networks try to use drivers outside this system. Some might use family or friends who lack licenses. Others might lure licensed drivers to take on extra jobs off the record. In both cases there are violations. A driver without a PHV license is clearly illegal – they have not undergone the background checks or medical exams required, nor is their personal car approved for commercial use. Even a licensed driver can be in breach if they take a booking that was not routed through their licensed operator (all PHV drivers in the UK must be affiliated with a licensed operator – they cannot work independently). The DVSA (Driver and Vehicle Standards Agency) and local enforcement teams keep an eye on rogue operations . If drivers are caught carrying paying passengers without proper insurance or vehicle inspection (MOT for hire vehicles, etc.), they can be fined and the car can be impounded. There have been instances of drivers being charged for no insurance when caught via these stings (since personal car insurance is invalid if you are found to be essentially acting as a taxi without declaring it) . The Heathrow Operation Gadi, for example, not only arrested drivers for touting but also issued 15 traffic offense reports for issues like no insurance and illegal plates . This shows that many unlicensed drivers are also driving uninsured or with vehicle infractions – a common situation in illegal networks, as compliance is not monitored. In the UK context, there is also a distinction for larger vehicles: a van or minibus with 9+ seats requires a Public Service Vehicle (PSV) operator’s license and the driver needs a PCV (passenger carrying vehicle) license. Some airport transfer services use 9-seater vans; illegal ones often ignore these additional requirements, running a de facto bus service with neither PSV license nor proper driver credentials, which is another layer of illegality .

Consumer Protection and Misrepresentation: UK law (like EU law) prohibits misleading consumers. If an OTA presents itself as offering a legit “airport transfer” but in reality is unlicensed and using unvetted drivers, it’s potentially a violation of the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 . British regulators can act on such grounds too. In practice, however, cracking down on a company for misrepresentation often accompanies the licensing enforcement. A notable example was the UK courts referencing how Uber’s early operations misled consumers about legality and safety, which paralleled the French finding of deception . Thus, illegal OTAs in UK not only break transport laws but also consumer laws by “providing a service under the guise of legality” when it is not .

Money Flow and Payments in the UK Chain

The flow of money in the UK illegal transfer chain is similar to the EU scenario, with some UK-specific observations:

• OTA Collection: The OTA (if based in the UK) taking payment without VAT is immediately an issue. Many illegal operators therefore route payments through an offshore entity. It’s common to see payments processed in another country – for instance, your credit card might be charged by “XYZ Travel Ltd – Cyprus” or some entity outside UK jurisdiction. This makes it harder for HMRC to track the transaction and also might attempt to avoid the requirement to include VAT in the advertised price. UK law mandates that quoted consumer prices include VAT if applicable . If an OTA displays a price without mentioning VAT and does not include it, that’s both a tax and a consumer law breach. Some crafty OTAs try to word it as if the driver is charging VAT separately or that the service might be zero-rated (which it isn’t, except for certain passenger transport like rural buses or ferries, none of which apply to private cars). Essentially, the OTA either pockets the 20% as extra profit or uses the pricing advantage to undercut competitors. The funds collected may go into foreign bank accounts. This cross-border flow was exactly how Uber structured its UK business (with Uber BV in the Netherlands handling the money). As Reuters reported, Uber’s arrangement let it avoid UK VAT, giving it a pricing edge over domestic competitors who had to charge 20% more . Illegal OTA networks mimic this by not registering in the UK at all.

• Aggregator/Platform Fees: If a separate aggregator is involved, it may take a cut. For example, an OTA might actually be a front that hands off to a known ride platform. Consider if an OTA used a transfer aggregating service or another third-party – that third-party might not charge VAT to the OTA, claiming intermediary status. The OTA then upcharges the customer. In one analysis, if an OTA resells a ride from such a platform and adds margin, the OTA could inadvertently create a VAT obligation on the full amount . Many illegal setups ignore this nuance, effectively leaving that VAT uncollected as well. The money then flows to the platform net of their commission. In truly illicit setups, the OTA and aggregator are the same operator, so they just split internally (or the OTA keeps everything and pays the driver directly).

• Driver Payment: UK unlicensed drivers might be paid in cash more frequently than in some EU cases, because cash leaves no trace. A traveler might be told “Pay the driver £40 in cash” even though they booked online (with perhaps just a small deposit paid by card). This hybrid approach is a red flag; reputable services do not ask for large cash payments on pre-bookings. If cash isn’t used, then the driver typically gets a bank transfer or an e-wallet payment from the OTA/aggregator after the fact. Some unlicensed setups use PayPal or other services to pay drivers, labeling the payments innocuously. From an HMRC perspective, if these drivers are not declaring income, it’s untaxed earnings. Many drivers likely treat it as under-the-table pay. The OTA might classify the driver as an independent contractor and not issue any tax documents. Given the fragmented nature (lots of one-man operators), the risk of HMRC linking the payments to a tax obligation is low unless an audit is done. Thus, much of the income slides by untaxed. It’s worth noting that after Uber started charging VAT on UK rides, the ride prices went up, which in a fair market they should. Illegal services that continue not to charge VAT can keep prices ~20% lower (or pocket that difference). This money flow discrepancy is essentially money that should have gone to the government but instead is being split between the OTA and driver.

In summary, the UK chain’s finances revolve around keeping transactions opaque and often offshore. The OTA/aggregator structure is used to dilute responsibility for VAT, while drivers are paid in ways that avoid creating taxable records. The end result is similar to the EU: the government misses out on VAT and income tax, and the illegal network gains a cost advantage.

Economic Impact in the UK: Tax Losses and Market Effects

The impact of these illegal operations in the UK has been significant enough to garner political and legal attention:

• VAT and Tax Revenue: As noted, one of the most concrete impacts has been VAT leakage. Before enforcement caught up, HMRC was estimated to be losing around £40 million per year from Uber alone in uncollected VAT . Advocacy groups and competitors highlighted that this allowed Uber (and by extension any similar platform) to unfairly undercut traditional firms by about 20% on price. Eventually, legal challenges (including one by a tax lawyer via a CrowdJustice campaign) pressured HMRC to act. Uber’s eventual settlement of £615 million for unpaid UK VAT indicates the magnitude of the past shortfall – and that covers just one company’s liability. If we consider numerous smaller OTA-style operators that have not yet been brought to book, the cumulative tax loss could be substantial. Even if each is small, together they erode the tax base. The UK government in its budgets has started addressing this by clarifying rules for “platform economy” transactions. For example, HMRC has proposed that ride-hailing apps be treated clearly as principals for VAT, removing ambiguity. In 2024, the Chancellor announced a consultation on ensuring all mini-cab providers levy VAT to prevent any loophole usage . This shows that the government recognizes the need to capture revenue currently leaking out via grey-market practices.

• Licensing and Legal Costs: The prevalence of unlicensed operations forced regulatory responses that themselves consume public resources. TfL and other local authorities have had to scale up enforcement. The legal battles (such as TfL vs Uber, or council licensing cases) cost time and money, as do police operations at airports to catch touts. While these are necessary, they are essentially reactive costs due to the grey-market players. If those operators were compliant from the start, authorities could focus resources elsewhere. Local licensed operators often feel the pinch first – for example, licensed minicab firms in London saw business drop in the face of Uber’s rise, partly because Uber’s initial quasi-legal model let it be cheaper. We can analogize that to smaller illegal OTAs now: they might cut into the customer base of local taxi firms or the official “airport authorized” taxi/transfer services. Heathrow’s case is telling – BAA (the airport company) had to employ a dedicated team to combat illegal cabbing, essentially a cost to maintain order and protect the licensed trade .

• Scale of Grey Market: It’s hard to put exact numbers on the grey market size in the UK, but consider that by 2022 Uber had about 70,000 drivers in the UK. If even a fraction of that number participate in off-platform, unregulated jobs, it represents a sizable informal sector. Additionally, other platforms like Bolt, Ola (when it launched), etc., also had to get licensed – but any that tried to skirt rules would add to the grey market. Outside the big cities, the grey market might manifest as unlicensed “taxi” services in towns, sometimes arranged via Facebook or local OTAs, that operate entirely off the books. The Department for Transport’s statistics (2023) counted about 300,000 licensed taxi/PHV drivers in England . If illegal operations account for even 5-10% more (drivers or rides), that’s tens of thousands of rides happening without oversight. The grey-market growth was particularly notable during times of regulatory uncertainty – e.g., when Uber’s licensing was in question, some copycats popped up to fill the gap but without bothering with licenses. Years of leniency toward “it’s just an app” claims created a perception that one could operate and only later worry about licenses. The High Court’s 2023 ruling firmly ended that debate, making it clear that being an app is no defense . Now, any OTA or platform continuing to ignore licensing is doing so willfully in violation of settled law.

• Impact on Legitimate Industry and Consumers: The illegal practices have a twofold economic impact on legitimate businesses: lost customers and pressure to reduce prices (and margins). Traditional private hire companies in the UK have to charge VAT (if above the threshold) and comply with licensing costs – this typically means their prices are a bit higher. An illegal competitor advertising online can siphon price-sensitive customers away. Furthermore, if consumers have bad experiences with illegal operators (unsafe rides, overcharging, etc.), it can tarnish the overall reputation of the private hire industry. In one extreme case, an unlicensed minicab driver in London committed a serious crime (rape of a passenger) , leading to public outcry about unlicensed cabs. Such incidents make travelers more wary, which can hurt the volume of business for everyone, or push more people to use only well-known apps. In economic terms, this is a negative externality caused by the grey market – the legitimate market has to work harder to prove its safety and may lose some potential customers who opt for other transport modes out of fear.

Real-World Enforcement Examples: The UK has seen concrete actions against these practices. Aside from Uber’s legal saga (which resulted in compliance), smaller outfits have been targeted. In 2018, TfL prosecuted an online minibus hire firm that was brokering rides without a license. In another instance, a South East England-based OTA that sold cheap airport transfers got served an order by the local council for unlicensed trading. The Heathrow airport crackdowns (Operation Gadi and Operation Perimeter) have led to multiple arrests and vehicles seized just in the past couple of years . Magistrates’ courts regularly hear cases of individual illegal cab drivers, issuing fines and disqualifications. These efforts, while ongoing, indicate that the grey market is being actively challenged. The Mayor of London publicly stated in early 2023 that cracking down on airport touts is a priority, acknowledging that organized gangs were involved and pledging more funding for enforcement teams .

The economic message is clear: the UK intends to recoup lost taxes and eliminate the unfair cost advantage that illegal OTA networks have enjoyed. Whether through back-tax settlements (like HMRC’s with Uber) or through criminal penalties that deter operators, the goal is to level the field. For consumers and the economy, cleaning up this grey area should lead to a safer, more transparent market where legitimate companies can compete fairly and public revenues are protected. Already, the requirement for Uber and similar services to charge VAT has narrowed the price gap, demonstrating that when laws are enforced, the supposed “cheapness” of grey-market rides largely evaporates. What remains then is for enforcement to catch the smaller players that are still operating under the radar – a process that is ongoing via multi-agency efforts in the UK.

Conclusion and Outlook

Both in the European Union and the United Kingdom, the model of illegal OTAs collaborating with unlicensed aggregators and drivers is increasingly viewed as an unacceptable evasion of law. The chain of OTA–aggregator–driver, which was once ambiguously positioned in regulatory grey zones, has now been clearly delineated by courts: if you arrange and charge for rides, you are a transport operator – regardless of what you call yourself online . This clarification has enabled tax authorities and regulators to pursue these companies for the VAT and licensing they have been dodging.

Key takeaways include:

• In the EU, an OTA that fixes prices and assigns rides must get licensed itself in each country . Operating a transport service illegally can lead to injunctions, fines, and even criminal charges (as seen with UberPOP’s ban and penalties) . VAT must be collected in the country of the ride; claiming “agent” status won’t hold up if the platform behaves like the supplier . The EU’s push for a level playing field means that exploiting loopholes is a short-lived strategy – recent years have shown a trend of authorities reclassifying fake intermediaries as actual transport providers and imposing full tax/licensing duties on them .

• In the UK, the law is even more explicit: anyone setting prices for booking is the principal and needs a PHV operator license . HMRC expects 20% VAT on rides and has demonstrated it will chase down evaders – the forced change in Uber’s model and the large VAT settlements are testament to that . Enforcement operations at airports and cities show that unlicensed drivers will be arrested and prosecuted, and illegal operators can be shut down.

Economically, while illegal networks for a time undercut licensed services (skirting perhaps 20-30% of costs), the gap is closing as enforcement catches up. The grey market, once growing rapidly, is now squarely in regulators’ sights, and several high-profile legal victories for regulators have emboldened further action. The cost of non-compliance is rising: retroactive tax bills, heavy fines, and even jail time in some cases. For example, French courts not only fined Uber but also convicted executives for facilitating unlicensed transport , sending a strong signal. In the UK, operators can face unlimited fines for unlicensed activity and drivers can lose their driving privileges or worse.

From a policy perspective, the consensus now is that digital innovation is welcome, but cannot come at the expense of fundamental legal protections and fair competition . Legitimate companies are adapting – many OTAs are ensuring they work only with licensed providers or adjusting their model to a pure marketplace where licensed drivers set the price (to remain an intermediary within the law) . Those that do not adapt are increasingly exposed.

Economic impact going forward: Clamping down on illegal OTA networks should help recover tax revenue and improve market conditions. Consumers may see slightly higher prices once VAT and proper costs are included, but they will also benefit from safer and more reliable services with accountable providers. Governments stand to regain millions in lost VAT and income taxes, which can be reinvested in infrastructure or enforcement. Legitimate transport operators will no longer be unfairly undercut by ghost companies. In the long run, integrating ground transfers into the formal economy can also allow for better labor standards for drivers and better consumer protection.

In conclusion, the era of wild-west online transport services in Europe is drawing to a close. The OTA–aggregator–driver chain, when operated illegally, has been proven to violate tax laws, transport regulations, and consumer rights. Both the EU and UK have developed robust legal frameworks and precedents to address these issues. The onus is now on all players – big or small – to “play by the rules” or face the consequences . The collaborations that once enabled unlicensed, untaxed transport are increasingly untenable. While enforcement is not perfect and some grey-market activity persists, the trajectory is clear: regulators are actively dismantling these illegal networks to restore fairness and safety in the ground transport transfer market.

Sources:

• European Court of Justice rulings and EU transport policy analyses

• UK High Court ruling on Uber Britannia (2023) and licensing regulations

• GetTransfer Legal Analysis Blog – Reselling Ground Transportation Services by OTAs in the UK and EU (2025)

• GetTransfer Legal Analysis Blog – How to Legally Resell Transportation Services… (2025)

• Reuters investigative report on Uber’s VAT avoidance in the UK

• eKathimerini news on Greek police crackdown on illegal airport vans (2024)

• Connexion France report on CDG airport fighting illegal taxis (2018)

• London Assembly (Mayor’s Question) report on Heathrow touts (2024)

• London Standard news on Heathrow taxi tout conflict (2013)

• Traicy news on Klook and Booking.com facilitating illegal “white taxis” (2023)

• Swedish Taxi Association data on tax losses from taxi black economy

• The Guardian and Yahoo Finance reports on Uber’s UK tax settlement (2022) and HMRC court battles.