Intermediary or Operator? Legal Limits on Price-Setting and Driver Assignment in EU/UK Transport Platforms

はじめに

Digital platforms in the transportation sector often position themselves as mere intermediaries connecting drivers and passengers. By claiming to be 「情報社会サービス」（ISS） under EU law or simple agents under UK law, these companies seek to avoid the regulatory burdens placed on transport operators. However, EU and UK legal frameworks draw a clear line: an intermediary cannot set the prices for rides or assign drivers to customers without losing its legal status as a neutral platform. Once a platform goes beyond a “mere conduit” role and exerts control over key terms of the service, it is treated as a transport operator in the eyes of the law. This paper analyzes why intermediaries in EU and UK transport cannot lawfully fix fares or dispatch drivers if they wish to remain within the legal safe harbor for intermediaries. We examine the E-Commerce Directive (Directive 2000/31/EC) — particularly Articles 12–15 and Recital 42 — and relevant case law, and we discuss the implications for platforms like CarTrawler, サン・トランスファーそして ウェルカム・ピックアップ that cross the line from intermediary to transport provider.

Directive 2000/31/EC: Liability Safe Harbors for Passive Intermediaries

The EU’s Directive 2000/31/EC (the “E-Commerce Directive”) provides liability exemptions for online intermediary services, but only under strict conditions of neutrality. In essence, an 情報社会サービス provider is shielded from liability for third-party content only when its role is purely technical, automatic, and passive . Recital 42 of the Directive emphasizes that the liability exemptions “cover only cases where the activity of the information society service provider is limited to the technical process of operating and giving access to a communication network… this activity is of a mere technical, automatic and passive nature, which implies that the provider has neither knowledge of nor control over the information which is transmitted or stored” . In other words, to benefit from the safe harbor, the intermediary must remain neutral as to the content it carries. Any knowledge or control over the information (for example, intervening in what is being transmitted) can remove the service from the protected category.

The Directive’s Article 12 (“mere conduit”) illustrates this principle. It provides that an ISS provider who transmits information from users or provides access to a network will not be liable for that information “on condition that” the provider (a) “does not initiate the transmission,” (b) “does not select the receiver of the transmission,” そして (c) “does not select or modify the information contained in the transmission” . These criteria mean the intermediary should function like a digital pipeline – simply carrying requests and responses between users and providers without altering them or selectively delivering them. Similarly, Article 13 (caching) そして Article 14 (hosting) grant safe harbors for, respectively, the temporary storage and hosting of user-provided information, again under conditions including no modification of the data and lack of awareness of illegality . Notably, Article 14(2) even clarifies that the hosting exemption “shall not apply when the recipient of the service is acting under the authority or the control of the provider” – if the supposedly independent user (e.g. a driver posting information) is effectively controlled by the platform, the platform cannot claim to be a neutral host. Finally, Article 15 prohibits EU Member States from imposing general obligations on intermediaries to monitor information they transmit or store, reinforcing that intermediaries are not expected to actively manage or curate user content .

Recital 43 of the Directive underscores that an intermediary must not modify the information it handles to enjoy the “mere conduit” or “caching” liability shields . Only purely technical manipulations (like data formatting or compression that do not alter content) are permitted without losing immunity . In short, EU law establishes that a “mere conduit” intermediary should be a passive carrier of information. The pricing of a service, the terms of an offer, and the selection of the service provider are all considered part of the “information” being transmitted between the parties. Therefore, an ISS platform that determines these terms itself – such as setting the price for a ride or unilaterally assigning a driver to a customer – is no longer passive or neutral. It is modifying or controlling the content of the transaction, which takes it outside the scope of the E-Commerce Directive’s immunity .

Control over Pricing and Driver Assignment as “Content” Modification

Under the above principles, the fare for a journey and the choice of driver are not just business decisions – they are legally viewed as the content of the service offer. A truly neutral platform would allow these elements to be determined by the transacting parties (the driver/operator and the passenger) with the platform merely relaying the information. For example, a neutral marketplace might let multiple drivers quote their own prices for a passenger’s requested trip, leaving the passenger to choose among them. By contrast, if the platform itself sets a fixed, non-negotiable fare for the trip and forbids any deviation, it has taken over the role of the service provider in determining price. Likewise, if the platform automatically assigns a driver to a customer’s request (dispatching a particular driver without input from the customer or independent choice by the driver), it has usurped control of which provider will execute the service. These actions amount to the platform injecting its own decisions into the content of the service agreement, rather than merely facilitating a connection.

Indeed, indicators such as fixed pricing and dispatching are red flags that a platform is functioning as more than an intermediary. A recent industry analysis noted that a “true intermediary” in transport allows providers to set their own prices, whereas a “‘grey’ platform” typically sets uniform fares そして prevents suppliers or users from negotiating or seeing alternatives . For instance, a grey-market ride platform may impose “fixed fares for suppliers,” prohibit drivers from adjusting their rates, and only show the customer the single price the platform has determined . This means the platform is controlling the transactional information (the price) rather than letting the price emerge from driver competition or agreement with the passenger. The Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) has highlighted such control over pricing as a decisive factor in classifying a service as transport rather than digital intermediation. In the Uber case (discussed below), Uber’s fare-setting model – where the app, not the driver, fixes the price – was instrumental in the Court’s conclusion that Uber is performing more than a neutral intermediation .

Similarly, the act of assigning drivers to trips is a form of controlling the service content. A neutral platform might list available drivers and let the user select, or let drivers choose which requests to accept. But when a platform directly dispatches a specific driver to a passenger, it takes an active role in executing the service . The difference is highlighted by comparing two CJEU cases: one concerning Uber and another involving a Romanian platform called スタータクシーアプリ. Uber’s model gave it significant influence over how rides are carried out – Uber’s system matches riders with drivers automatically and dictates terms of the ride, leading the court to view Uber as performing the transport service. In contrast, Star Taxi App operated more like a classifieds service for licensed taxi drivers: it did not set fares or assign drivers, leaving those aspects to the existing taxi regime. The CJEU accepted that Star Taxi App “merely facilitated licensed taxi connections” and thus remained a genuine ISS intermediary, whereas *“Uber’s influence over ride pricing and driver activity led to its classification as a transport provider” . This comparison illustrates that platforms which refrain from controlling price and driver selection can claim the legal privileges of intermediaries, but once they start managing these elements, they cross into the territory of transport operators.

EU Law: From “Information Society Service” to Transport Service Provider

When an intermediary crosses the line from passive facilitator to active orchestrator of a transport service, EU law no longer treats it as a protected ISS. Asociación Profesional Elite Taxi v. Uber (CJEU, 2017) was the landmark case confirming this principle. In that case, a Barcelona taxi association argued Uber’s ride-hailing platform was essentially an illegal taxi operation. The CJEU examined Uber’s activities and ruled that Uber “must be classified as a service in the field of transport,” not as an information society service, because the intermediation provided by Uber was “inextricably linked to a transport service” . The Court noted several critical facts about Uber’s model: Uber recruited the drivers (non-professional individuals using their own vehicles), set or at least fixed the fare that passengers pay, and exercised a decisive influence over the conditions of the service . In particular, Uber controlled essential elements of the service – notably the price of the ride and the conduct of drivers (through ratings, rules, and assignment of trips) – such that “without Uber’s platform, the drivers would not have access to the passengers” . Because Uber effectively organizes and manages the transport transaction, the Court determined it is “more than a simple matchmaking platform” and is “effectively a transport operator” subject to transport regulations .

This classification had significant consequences. Once deemed a transport service (rather than a mere ISS), Uber could no longer invoke the protections of the E-Commerce Directive or the EU freedom to provide information services to avoid complying with local taxi laws . The CJEU explicitly held that EU Member States are free to regulate services like Uber as transport services – including imposing licensing requirements, service standards, or outright bans on unlicensed operations – without running afoul of EU single market rules . In a subsequent case, Uber France SAS (CJEU, 2018), Uber was prosecuted for facilitating unlicensed transport (the UberPop service). Uber argued France should have notified the European Commission before regulating it, on the theory that Uber was an ISS. The CJEU flatly rejected this defense, reaffirming that Uber’s service is in the transport field, not a cross-border information service, so France’s enforcement of taxi licensing laws did not need prior EU approval . In essence, the EU courts recognized that a company which coordinates rides by setting fares and assigning drivers for remuneration is providing a transport service, not merely a digital marketplace . Such a company “cannot hide behind being a ‘tech platform’ to circumvent taxi and private hire regulations” .

The implication is clear: any platform that mirrors Uber’s level of control over the service will be treated like Uber under the law . If an online platform fixes the prices for rides and pairs customers with drivers as part of its normal operation, then under EU law it is “inherently linked to transport” and not an ISS in the intended sense . National authorities can require it to obtain transport operator licenses and comply with all sector-specific rules. The liability safe harbors of the E-Commerce Directive no longer apply, because the platform is no longer acting as a neutral conduit of someone else’s content but is instead providing the core service itself. To put it succinctly: a platform that “looks like Uber, works like Uber, and earns like Uber, should be regulated like Uber” – a sentiment increasingly echoed by courts and regulators in the EU.

UK Law: Intermediary vs Operator in Private Hire Regulation

In the United Kingdom, even apart from EU law, a similar principle has evolved in domestic transport regulation. UK private hire and taxi laws have long required that any person or company that accepts or arranges a ride booking must be properly licensed as an operator. For example, under London’s regulatory regime, the Private Hire Vehicles (London) Act 1998 makes it unlawful for anyone to “make provision for the invitation or acceptance of” private hire bookings without holding an operator’s licence . The effect of this and similar laws nationwide (like the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 for towns outside London) is that any entity interposed between passenger and driver in arranging a ride is deemed an operator by law. Operating without the requisite licence is a criminal offence .

For years, some ride intermediaries tried to style themselves as mere “agents” of the drivers to sidestep direct licensing. They would claim that the actual contract for hire was only between the passenger and the driver, with the platform just acting as a booking agent on the driver’s behalf. This argument was tested decisively in United Trade Action Group (UTAG) Ltd v. Transport for London [2021] EWHC 3290 (Admin). In that case, brought by a coalition of black cab interests, the High Court examined whether Uber and similar app-based services could lawfully operate on an “agent” model. The court “decisively rejected the notion that a PHV operator can be a mere agent for drivers.” Uber (with support from another app, Free Now) had sought a declaration that it would comply with the law by accepting bookings as agent for its drivers, rather than contracting directly with passengers . The High Court disagreed. It held that under the 1998 Act, when a licensed operator accepts a booking, it must undertake the ride as a principal party to the contract with the passenger . In the court’s words, “acceptance of a booking by the operator will create a contract between the operator and the passenger” whereby the operator promises to provide the transportation service as principal (i.e. the operator **itself undertakes to send a vehicle and driver for the passenger) . The operator cannot evade liability by claiming to act on behalf of the driver – any such arrangement is incompatible with the regulatory scheme . This ruling made it clear that Uber’s previous practice of disavowing a contract with the passenger (pretending the driver was the only carrier) was not lawful . In practical terms, after UTAG v TfL, Uber and similar platforms had to change their terms and business models to acknowledge that they contract with passengers directly as the provider of transport . The “agent” fiction was no longer tenable in UK private hire law.

Importantly, this principle now applies throughout the UK. In Uber Britannia Ltd v Sefton MBC [2023] EWHC 1731 (Admin), the High Court confirmed that the same rule (from the London case) applies under the 1976 Act outside London . Any company that accepts a private hire booking anywhere in England and Wales is legally the operator そして “bears direct responsibility for the journey” . The courts stressed this interpretation promotes public safety and accountability: passengers know whom they can hold accountable (the licensed operator) and regulators know whom to oversee . In summary, UK law now squarely treats accepting and assigning a ride booking as an operator function, not a broker service. A platform cannot legally present itself as a mere intermediary once it is controlling essential aspects of the booking (taking the booking and dispatching a driver) – if it does so without an operator’s licence, it is operating unlawfully . The UK legal expectation is that “any entity that accepts a private hire booking is… the operator”, with all attendant obligations .

Thus, in the UK context, the act of setting the fare and allocating a driver to a booking is firmly within the domain of the licensed operator’s role. An unlicensed platform engaging in those activities will be treated by courts and regulators as an illegal operator, regardless of how it labels itself in contracts. The economic reality trumps the contractual labels: if the platform walks, talks, and acts like a transport operator, the law will consider it one .

Crossing the Line: Case Studies of “Intermediaries” Acting as Operators

The legal principles above shed light on why certain well-known transport platforms in the UK and EU are violating intermediary restrictions by setting prices or assigning drivers. Platforms such as CarTrawler, Suntransfers, そして ウェルカム・ピックアップ often market themselves as mere booking agents or “marketplaces,” but their operational model tells a different story. By controlling the price of rides and orchestrating which driver fulfills a booking, they step into the role of a transport service provider – triggering legal obligations and losing the legal immunities afforded to neutral intermediaries.

• CarTrawler: CarTrawler is a B2B technology platform that powers ground transport bookings for airlines and travel brands. While CarTrawler’s terms describe it as an agent introducing customers to local transport suppliers, in practice CarTrawler’s system fixes the fare and selects the driver or transport company for each ride . For example, when an airline website offers an “airport transfer” via CarTrawler, the customer is quoted a set price determined by CarTrawler’s algorithm (not by the driver) and CarTrawler then dispatches a local car service or driver from its network to perform the trip . CarTrawler thus “controls key terms of the transaction” – it controls pricing, vehicle options, and driver assignment – which means it is not leaving those terms to the actual transport provider . Under EU law, this level of control makes CarTrawler’s service “inherently linked to transport,” just like Uber’s, and not a passive digital service. Indeed, as the CarTrawler legal analysis notes, EU jurisprudence (the Uber cases) indicates that CarTrawler’s price-setting and vehicle assignment are the very elements of “decisive influence” that mark it as a transport provider . CarTrawler cannot claim the benefit of the E-Commerce Directive safe harbor while engaging in such active involvement . Likewise, under UK law, CarTrawler is effectively acting as a private hire vehicle (PHV) operator by “accepting bookings” and “dispatching a driver” for hire, without a PHV operator licence – a breach of UK law . The UTAG v TfL precedent makes clear that CarTrawler’s role in each booking means it “undertakes as principal to provide the vehicle and driver,” so it must be licensed or else it is an illegal operator . In short, CarTrawler’s practice of setting fares and assigning rides places it squarely in the operator category, regardless of its self-description as an intermediary.
• Suntransfers: Suntransfers (often referred to in the market as Suntransfers.com) is a popular online platform for pre-booked holiday transfers and airport taxis. It advertises “low-cost airport transfers” and takes online bookings from travelers. In substance, Suntransfers acts like an online travel agency that offers a fixed price for a route and then arranges a local driver or vehicle to fulfill the trip. The customer typically pays Suntransfers upfront for the quoted fare, which means the price is set by the platform. The local transport provider (taxi or shuttle company) is later instructed to carry out the transfer for that pre-set price. This model is analogous to the OTA/Aggregator chain described in our analysis of the illegal driver market: the platform is an OTA that “sets a fixed price for the route” (thus “offering” the transport service itself) and then hands off the ride to a local partner or driver . By setting prices and selecting the driver or car service to execute the ride, Suntransfers is effectively acting as the transport provider rather than a neutral broker . EU law would view this as an integrated service (digital plus transport) outside the pure ISS realm, especially since the platform often partners with unlicensed local drivers or companies in some regions, functioning much like UberPop did . The CJEU’s ruling in Elite Taxi v. Uber confirms that a platform that “fixes the fare and selects a driver for the ride” is not a mere information society service but a transport service subject to regulation . Therefore, Suntransfers’s model of price-setting and driver-dispatch likely violates the intent of EU intermediary protections. In the UK, if Suntransfers takes bookings for journeys in the UK without a local operator licence, it would plainly be an unlawful PHV operator under the same logic as CarTrawler or Uber. The platform’s control over the key variables of the service (who drives and for how much) means it cannot legally pose as just an agent connecting travelers with drivers – it has assumed the role of an operator and would be required to obtain the corresponding licences and approvals.
• Welcome Pickups: Welcome Pickups is a platform specializing in airport and hospitality transfers, marketing itself as offering a curated, high-quality transfer experience. Unlike an open marketplace, Welcome Pickups promises standardized services (English-speaking drivers, set meet-and-greet procedures, etc.) at prices predetermined by the platform. In fact, Welcome Pickups’ operations have been directly compared to Uber’s. Although Welcome Pickups portrays itself as an intermediary that works with local drivers, it “sets standardized pricing and assigns professional drivers” to each customer booking – a model that aligns with that of Uber rather than a passive agent . The platform does not let drivers freely set their own rates for customers; instead, it fixes the transfer price that the customer pays. It also handles all the logistics of matching a booking to a specific driver in its network. In legal terms, Welcome Pickups is controlling the essential elements of the service (price and driver selection), which likely removes it from the safe harbor of a mere conduit ISS. If scrutinized under the CJEU’s criteria from the Uber cases, Welcome Pickups would be seen as “exercising significant control over pricing [and] driver assignments,” placing it in the category of a transport service provider rather than a neutral platform . Consequently, it cannot lawfully enjoy the freedoms of an unregulated ISS while imposing its own fares and dispatching drivers. Under UK law, similarly, Welcome Pickups would be regarded as accepting bookings and dispatching drivers – activities reserved to licensed operators. Without such a licence, its practice of arranging rides for a fee that it sets would be unlawful. In sum, despite its branding as a helpful travel concierge, Welcome Pickups crosses the intermediary/operator line by the very way it standardizes and controls the ride transactions.

結論

Modern mobility platforms must carefully navigate the boundary between being an open facilitator of transport services and becoming an operator of those services. EU law (Directive 2000/31/EC and its interpretation by the CJEU) makes it clear that if a platform wishes to benefit from the legal privileges of an “information society service”, it cannot design or control the core terms of the service being provided . Price-setting and driver-dispatch are emblematic examples of such control: an intermediary that dictates the fare or unilaterally chooses the service provider is no longer acting as a mere conduit of information, but rather as the orchestrator of the service. The legal result is that the platform loses immunity from liability and becomes subject to the sector-specific regulations of the service it is actually providing (here, transportation) . In the European Union, that means platforms like Uber, CarTrawler, or Welcome Pickups that manage pricing and assignments can be regulated as transport services by Member States, with requirements for licenses, safety standards, and tax compliance, rather than being free to operate as unregulated digital services . In the United Kingdom, the law goes a step further in explicitly codifying that any entity arranging private hire rides is a principal operator. An alleged “intermediary” that in reality accepts bookings and supplies drivers is deemed an operator in law そして must meet all operator licensing conditions, or else cease those activities .

The examples of CarTrawler, Suntransfers, Welcome Pickups (and indeed Uber itself) demonstrate how platforms can “cross the line” into operating as unlicensed transit companies when they exert control over the transaction. The legal frameworks in the EU and UK are increasingly aligned in condemning such models: if a platform controls the economic terms and performance of a transport service, it will be treated as the party providing that service, irrespective of any self-serving contractual disclaimers to the contrary . Intermediaries are permitted to exist, but only so long as they truly intermediate — that is, remain neutral and allow the actual service providers (drivers) to set the terms and make the offers. When digital platforms blur that line, the law imposes accountability. In summary, an intermediary in the transport sector cannot lawfully set prices or assign drivers without becoming, in the eyes of the law, a transport operator itself. The price of crossing that threshold is loss of legal protections and the onset of legal obligations – a reality that any such platform must heed if it intends to operate within the law.

情報源

• Directive 2000/31/EC of 8 June 2000 (E-Commerce Directive), especially Articles 12–15 and Recital 42 .
• Asociación Profesional Elite Taxi v. Uber Systems Spain, C-434/15 (CJEU Dec. 20, 2017) .
• Uber France SAS, C-320/16 (CJEU Apr. 10, 2018) .
• Star Taxi App SRL v. Bucharest Municipality, C-62/19 (CJEU Oct. 3, 2020) .
• United Trade Action Group Ltd v. Transport for London [2021] EWHC 3290 (Admin) ; and Uber Britannia Ltd v. Sefton Borough Council [2023] EWHC 1731 (Admin) .
• Alexander Pershikov, “Scaling Ride-Hailing Platforms In The U.K.: Tips For Growing Ethically” (Forbes.com, Apr. 10,2025) .
• Leo Besutti, “Legal Analysis: CarTrawler’s Status – Transport Operator or Intermediary in UK and EU?” (GetTransfer Blog, Apr. 17, 2025) .
• Leo Besutti, “Who Funds the Illegal Driver Market in the UK and EU?” (GetTransfer Blog, Feb. 2025) .
• Leo Besutti, “Uber and Welcome Pickups Share Exactly Similar Booking Processes” (GetTransfer Blog, Feb. 22, 2025) .
• ““Grey” Platforms: When Digital Platforms Cross the Line?” (GetTransfer Blog, 2025) .